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Fodor (1983) claims that the modularity of mind (the relatively encap-
sulated, insulated, special-purpose nature of the psychological mecha-
nisms of perception) helps undermine relativism in various forms. I 
shall show first, that the modular vision of mind provides insufficient 
support for the rejection of (most forms of) relativism, and second, that 
an alternative (‘neural constructivist’) model may, in fact, provide a 
better empirical response to the relativist challenge. 
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Introduction 
Fodor (1983) defends a model of cognitive architecture in which there is a 
profound difference between perceptual processes and higher order cogni-
tive processes — between processes underlying sensory experience and 
those involved in problem solving, decision making, inference and reflective 
thought. Contrary to models of cognition in which the continuity of these 
two types of processes is assumed, Fodor’s main thesis is that the psycho-
logical mechanisms involved in perception are encapsulated, i.e., they consist 
in a variety of computational modules whose operations don’t have access to 
the information stored by each other or by the system’s central processing 
mechanisms. Such modules are autonomous, innately specified, and specific 
to their particular domains. Their outputs feed into — but not from — cogni-
tive processes underlying higher cognitive faculties. As a result the flow of 
information is organized in a bottom-to-top fashion. Unlike perceptual 
modules however, the mechanisms underlying higher cognitive processes 
are characterized by the complete absence of encapsulation. Central systems 
can operate on the basis of information contained in any module, and are 
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“characterized by computations in which information flows every which 
way” (Fodor, 1985, p. 4). 
There are other characteristics that help sharpen the distinction between 
perception and higher-level cognition, but they are not my concern in this 
paper. The issue I shall address is the plausibility of the deep parallelism 
that Fodor claims exists between interactionist models of mind and general 
relativist theses. It is this putative parallelism that drives much of Fodor’s 
thought. We read, for example, that: 
“The idea that cognition saturates perception belongs with (and is, in-
deed, historically connected with) the idea in the philosophy of sci-
ence that one’s observations are comprehensively determined by 
one’s theories; with the idea in anthropology that one’s values are 
comprehensively determined by one’s culture; with the idea in sociol-
ogy that one’s epistemic commitments, including especially one’s sci-
ence, are comprehensively determined by one’s class affiliations; and 
with the idea in linguistics that one’s metaphysics is comprehensively 
determined by one’s syntax. All these ideas imply a sort of relativistic 
holism [in which] perception is saturated by cognition, observation by 
theory, values by culture, science by class, and metaphysics by lan-
guage ... 
The thing is: I hate relativism ... More to the point, I think that relativ-
ism is very probably false. What it overlooks, to put it briefly and 
crudely, is the fixed structure of human nature.”(Fodor, 1985, p. 5). 
One of the most important philosophical consequences of the modularity 
thesis is, according to Fodor, that we can use it as an argument against 
global relativist positions. In other words, if it turns out to be true that our 
cognitive architecture involves perceptual cognitive modules which unidi-
rectionally feed information about the world into a more flexible but still 
fixed, i.e., genetically determined, central system, then we have — Fodor 
claims — a new tool to combat relativism. 
The main goal of this paper is to analyze in more detail this alleged rela-
tionship between modularity and relativism. In Section 1 I introduce some 
basic varieties of relativism. The purpose of this section is to get a better 
understanding of the kind of position that Fodor hopes to refute via the 
modularity hypothesis. In Section 2 I address the question of whether the 
encapsulation of perceptual processes guarantees the non-relativist character 
of our perceptions. I argue that this is doubtful, but that even if we assume 
that it does (for the sake of the argument), a more important problem re-
mains, viz., whether such encapsulated perceptions can themselves guaran-
tee the non-relativist nature of conceptual apprehension and judgment. Sec-
tion 3 introduces an alternative (neural-constructivist) model of cognition. 
This model — unlike Fodor’s modularity hypothesis — depicts the modular 
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structure of the brain not as the starting point of our cognitive development 
but rather as the end result of an experience-dependent period of neural 
growth. This dynamic interaction between environmentally dependent neu-
ral activity and developmental mechanisms actually lends better support — 
I finally argue — to a broadly anti-relativist view of how our brains repre-
sent the world. 
1. Varieties of relativism 
It is important to begin by drawing certain distinctions among the varieties 
of relativism. Relativist views share, as Fodor notes, a common flavor. But 
there remain enough differences to warrant some more fine-grained classifi-
cation. It is common, for example, to divide relativist theses into metaphysi-
cal, epistemological and semantic subspecies. These varieties can be roughly 
characterized as follows: 
i) Metaphysical Relativism: The claim that what there is, whatever exists — 
e.g., medium-sized objects, facts, theoretical entities, etc. — exists only 
within the framework of a particular subject, community, or theory. 
ii) Epistemological Relativism: That claim that what we believe and what 
we know is relative to a person, a culture or a particular framework of 
reasoning. 
iii) Semantic Relativism: The claim that the truth of our statements is relative 
with respect to subjects, communities, languages or particular theories. 
In general, and despite the need for some qualifications (see below), it is 
proper to characterize all these relativist theses as being opposed to some 
realist ones. The reasons become apparent if we consider the most funda-
mental kinds of realist claims. The metaphysical realist maintains that there 
is an objective world, ‘objective’ in the sense of being constituted by objects 
and properties which are what they are independently of the knowledge we 
have about them and independently of the cognitive resources available to 
us to achieve such knowledge. The existence of these objects and properties 
is thus absolutely fixed and independent of any epistemic considerations; it 
is completely independent of our mental activity, our practices and our 
background beliefs. The epistemological aspect of such realism is often for-
mulated as the claim that the objects and properties that constitute the world 
are capable of being known by us as they really are. Subjects have access to 
the world in which they live and are capable of obtaining objective informa-
tion about it. If we add to these claims one more component, namely, the 
idea that science is the enterprise that allows us to have epistemic access to 
this independent reality and that, therefore, the entities postulated by scien-
tific theories have the same ontological status as any other non-theoretical 
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entities — even when they lie beyond our observational capabilities —, then 
we arrive at the position usually called ‘scientific realism’.  
Now, some of these varieties of relativism are compatible with some of 
these types of realism. To mention just one case, some sociologists of science 
believe that there is an independent social reality to which their theories 
apply, but they also maintain that there is no theory or scientific method 
which can be justifiably accepted as the true one. These sociologists are, in 
other words, realists at the metaphysical level, but relativists at the episte-
mological or methodological level. The basic idea here, as elaborated by 
Kuhn (1962) and Feyerabend (1975), is that there is always incommensura-
bility at the observational level, i.e., that genuinely different theories about 
the same realm of reality can be compatible and can explain all the relevant 
data. 
However, Fodor’s use of the term ‘relativism’ is insensitive to these dis-
tinctions and tries to encompass all three varieties mentioned above without 
qualifications or refinements. Fodor’s position can be formulated as follows: 
if modular perceptual processes provide us with theory-neutral access to 
reality, then our epistemic situation is much as it was imagined to be in the 
good old days before Kuhn and Feyerabend. The observation-based ontol-
ogy with which we work is not just one among different alternatives all of 
which are compatible with our perceptual apparatus. Not only that, the ref-
erence of our observational terms is univocally determined and the truth 
value of the sentences in which they occur doesn’t change as a function of 
the different theoretical frameworks to which those terms belong. Fodor’s 
fundamental thesis thus has the form of a conditional: if the modularity hy-
pothesis is correct, our cognitive architecture itself constitutes a sufficient 
reason to reject all the varieties of relativism (ontological, epistemological, 
and semantic). 
There are many questions that one might ask regarding such a broad and 
controversial claim. The first is whether Fodor’s modularity hypothesis can 
indeed guarantee the existence even of theoretically neutral perceptual rep-
resentations. Even if it did, a further issue remains to be addressed, namely, 
whether such neutral perceptions really support a non-relativist view at the 
level of conceptual discourse, i.e., the kind of discourse in which we express 
our judgments and theories. I shall address both these topics in the next 
section (Section 2). A further question is how plausible, qua scientific hy-
pothesis, is the modularity thesis itself. In Section 3 some evidence is pre-
sented to support a rather different (‘neural constructivist’) view of our cog-
nitive architecture, one where modularity is not considered the beginning of 
our cognitive life but rather (at most) the end result of complex developmen-
tal interactions between brains and the environments in which they are em-
bedded. I argue that this alternative neuro-constructivist hypothesis actually 
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provides better reasons (than does Fodor’s modularity hypothesis) for skep-
ticism concerning strongly relativist views of certain kinds. 
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2. Process and product 
In order to discuss Fodor’s idea that the encapsulated character of our per-
ceptual processes provides support for a non-relativist view of perceptual 
representations, I would like to introduce a distinction between processing 
and product. It seems intuitively plausible to accept that the properties that 
can be appropriately ascribed to the processing of something don’t necessar-
ily have to be ascribed to the outcome or the product of such processing. The 
properties that are truly predicated of e.g. the processes involved in photo 
developing are not the same as (although they can be related to) the proper-
ties predicated of the final result, namely, the photographs themselves. 
To make this clearer, consider the domain of speech perception. When 
the users of a language speak, they don’t do so by maintaining a steady 
rhythm or delivering the words or sentences they utter at a constant speed. 
Speakers often slow down or accelerate the rhythm of phoneme production. 
This variation in speed of speech can be quite dramatic. The average dura-
tion of a syllable, for instance, can vary hundreds of milliseconds in a single 
conversation. At the level of speech processing, the acoustic properties that 
specify and determine the identity of phonetic fragments have a temporal 
character and are modified by speed and rhythm. However, if we pay atten-
tion to the outcome of that processing, i.e., if we focus on the phonetic seg-
ments of an utterance, what we find is a constant phonetic structure, a fixed 
structure that has already incorporated the speed at which the utterance was 
produced (Miller, 1987). 
What this and other cases of perceptual representation suggests is that 
the properties of perceptual processing don’t necessarily have to be shared 
by the properties of the outcome of such processing, i.e., by perceptual repre-
sentations. Therefore, even if we assume that the property of being encapsu-
lated obtains at the level of perceptual processing, that doesn’t necessarily 
guarantee the encapsulated character of the products of such processing, i.e., 
the encapsulated character of our perceptual representations. Since, accord-
ing to Fodor, being encapsulated — and hence immune to ‘top-down revi-
sion’ — is the key to blocking perceptual relativism, the proper conclusion is 
just that the mechanisms involved in the processing  leading to perceptual 
representations is fixed  for a given species and a given domain. However, 
from this (much weaker) claim, nothing much follows regarding the charac-
ter of the perceptual representations themselves. 
Now, it could be argued that Fodor’s own notion of encapsulation leaves 
open the possibility of communicating in a restricted way by means of an 
interface: 
“.. the representations that input systems deliver have to interface 
somewhere, and the computational mechanisms that effect the inter-
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face must ipso facto have access to information from more than one 
cognitive domain.” (Fodor, 1983, pp. 101-102). 
The question is: what may thus be communicated? The answer again does 
not seem to help Fodor block the threat of relativism at the level of the prod-
uct of perception. In order to see why, let’s re-visit some of Fodor’s consid-
erations regarding the nature of the architectural relationships that support 
exchanges of information between input systems and central systems. 
To begin with, it might be useful to remember that underlying Fodor’s 
argument there is one important assumption that he takes for granted: “the 
mechanisms that interface between vertical faculties have to be computa-
tional rather than, as one might say, merely mechanical” (Fodor, 1983, p. 
138, fn. 37). This is because the perceptual inferences which lead to percep-
tual representations are typically nondemonstrative and therefore subject to 
the realization of a confirmation function. But “the confirmation function for 
input systems does not have access to all of the information that the organ-
ism internally represents” (Fodor, 1983, p. 69). 
In other words — and using the previous example —, what is communi-
cated by speech processing mechanisms are acoustic properties such as speed 
of phonemes, but the confirmation function that determines the phonetic 
segments of an utterance are encapsulated with respect to any other non-
phonetic information. The information required for e.g. the determination of 
the lexical structure of a phonetic segment may be internally represented 
and accessible to other cognitive processes, but the mechanisms that effect 
this kind of interface between phonetic and lexical determination are not 
themselves encapsulated and therefore, according to Fodor, they belong to 
the central system. 
So, it is indeed true that there must be same kind of exchange of informa-
tion between perceptual representations which are the result of domain-
specific perceptual processing  and some other representations, but such ex-
change of information between perception and — what Fodor calls — utili-
ties occurs after the domain-specific perceptual representations have been 
determined, and involves “simultaneous results of input analysis in other 
domains” (Fodor, 1983, p. 102). All this supports our claim that encapsula-
tion during  perceptual integration — even allowing for the possibility of 
restricted communication via an interface — does not imply encapsulation of 
the mechanisms involved in the determination of the final cognitive product. 
But suppose we grant, just for the sake of argument, that encapsulation at 
the processing level somehow guarantees encapsulation at the level of the 
cognitive product. What follows? Unfortunately, still not much. For judg-
ments and beliefs can be considered (epistemically) neutral if and only if 
their truth doesn’t depend on the truth of a particular psychological or theo-
retical framework. But, as Paul Churchland has very elaborately argued “a 
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rigidity in our early perceptual processing is entirely consistent with plastic-
ity at the level of conceptual apprehension and discursive judgment” 
(Churchland, 1988, p. 170; see also Churchland, 1989, chapter 9)2. In other 
words, even ‘neutral’ perceptual representations can still be interpreted dif-
ferently against the background of different theoretical frameworks. Regard-
less of how encapsulated perceptual representations themselves might be, 
the correspondences that could be established between them and the do-
main of theoretical propositions (judgments, beliefs, etc.) remain many. Yet 
it is, surely, the higher-level relativisms of belief and judgment that Fodor is 
most concerned to avoid. 
Fodor himself admits, of course, that once we ascend to the level of cen-
tral processing, encapsulation disappears. But central processing, for Fodor, 
itself constitutes a fixed, non-plastic system, one that is largely innate and 
not susceptible to deep architectural modification by environmental inputs. 
The internal consistency of Fodor’s view thus depends, I believe, upon not 
just the encapsulated character of perceptual processing, nor even the en-
capsulated character of the perceptual representations themselves, but also 
on the innate and fixed  structure of the basic central cognitive architecture 
with which we are endowed. It is this additional dimension of evolutionarily 
determined fixity that limits the freedom of even central processing in inter-
preting and assimilating the deliverances of the perceptual modules (see 
Fodor, 1994, chapter 4). 
3. Neural constructivism, and an alternative 
response to relativism 
Consider next the emerging view known as neural-constructivism. I shall first 
introduce the main features of this view, and then show how it bears on the 
issues concerning modularity, relativism, and cognitive architecture. 
‘Neural-Constructivism’ names a body of recent research regarding the 
relation between neural activity and developmental change. Two major 
claims of the neural-constructivist movement are: a) that cognitive (includ-
ing cortical) development involves the experience-dependent construction of 
new neural mechanisms (not just the maturation or tuning of already estab-
lished ones), and b) that these mechanisms result from a dynamic interaction 
between the environment in which the agent is embedded and the agent’s 
existing neural architecture. Modularization is depicted as the endpoint of a 
long dynamic process in which learning experiences affect the very neural 
mechanisms involved in perception, thought, and experience. 
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Consider the visual system of babies and young infants. Approximately 1 
in 10,000 babies are born with congenital cataracts (Sireteanu, 1999). This 
condition, if untreated in infancy, prevents the children from ever develop-
ing normal vision — even if the condition is diagnosed and treated later in 
life. The lack of proper visual inputs at these very early stages, according to 
the neural-constructivist, inhibits the growth of new neurons in the visual 
cortex and the development of the necessary connections to enable the chil-
dren to see properly. Sireteanu reports a study (Maurer et. al., 1999) which 
shows the high plasticity of infants’ brains through a quite simple psycho-
physical test. The study was designed to assess the visual acuity of 28 hu-
man infants who were deprived of all patterned visual input by congenital 
cataracts in one or both eyes until they were treated at one week to nine 
months of age. The treatment consisted in the surgical removal of the cata-
racts and — after a certain period of recovery — the implantation of contact 
lenses. Only after the implantation of the lenses could visual input be fo-
cused on the retina. The test consisted in the measurement of visual acuity 
by exposure to objects containing clear patterns, such as black and white 
stripes. The results show that visual acuity does not improve postnatally 
until the nervous system receives patterned visual input. However, once 
treated, exposure to patterned visual input has a great and rapid impact 
upon the nervous system that results in improved acuity even as early as 
one hour after visual exposure to the test patterns! What this and other simi-
lar studies (e.g. Klinke, 1999)3 are claimed to show is not only the great plas-
ticity of the infants’ brain, but also the importance of early sensory input for 
shaping the neural structures that contribute to later development. 
The key neural constructivist claim is thus that, whether internally gen-
erated or prompted by external factors, neural activity at the cortical level 
plays an essential role, not just in selecting fixed neural mechanisms, but 
also in actually constructing new cortical circuits. This kind of constructive 
plasticity has lead some researchers (see e.g. O’Leary 1989, 1997) to talk 
about the cortex in young infants as proto-cortex, as a kind of neural architec-
ture that needs both the input of other regions in the brain and also experi-
ence-derived afferent inputs to become differentiated and domain specific. 
These types of input affect not only the function of cortical regions, but also 
their structure. 
There is a sense, of course, in which the neural-constructivist paradigm is 
not really such a new approach. Plasticity of orientation-sensitive neurons in 
the cat’s LGN was, for example, demonstrated back in the late fifties and 
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early sixties (cf. Held & Hein, 1958, 1963)4. But, although that’s surely true, 
the kind of neural plasticity shown by those studies was not — as it is in the 
case of the current neural-constructivist view — cortical plasticity. The idea 
of an interesting dynamic interaction between internal properties of the 
brain and environmental inputs was already there, but such interaction was 
demonstrated only in areas of the brain such as LGN. The contemporary 
neural-constructivist adds a new layer of complexity to those previous re-
sults by positing neural plasticity, not only at the peripheral level, but also at 
the cortical heart of ‘higher level cognition’ (cf. Schlagger & O’Leary, 1991; 
Roe, et. al, 1992). 
The neural constructivist model thus depicts a hierarchical experience-
dependent constructive development of prefrontal cortex. It is hierarchical 
because the patterns of cortical development re-organize themselves in an 
upward fashion, from the sensory periphery — especially primary sensory 
and motor cortical areas which mature very soon after birth — to higher and 
higher association areas. Cortical plasticity thus reaches deep into what Fo-
dor calls ‘central processing’. The process is constructive because develop-
ment does not consist just in the maturation of the cortical layers, but rather 
in the re-structuring of the cortical topology itself The prefrontal cortex — 
the part of the brain involved in higher cognitive capacities such as the tem-
poral organization of action, working memory, and inferential reasoning — 
seems to be built upon a cascade of increasingly complex re-organizations of 
representational structures whose development depends, in turn, on the 
development of other, more peripheral neural circuits: “PFC [pre-frontal 
cortex] appears to be the latest cortical structure to mature and also to un-
dergo the greatest post natal development” (Quartz, 1999, p. 54). 
The neural constructivist approach thus constitutes a radical challenge to 
traditional views of cognitive architecture and accounts of neural matura-
tion. The traditional image of fixed  neural mechanisms underlying processes 
of learning and biological processes of maturation is rejected in favor of a 
different model according to which learning processes may alter the cogni-
tive architecture itself — both at the level of perceptual modules and deeper 
processing structures. It is important to notice that — unlike selectionist and 
nativist models — one of the consequences of the constructivist approach is 
that learning no longer consists in searching through a fixed , pre-established 
hypothesis space. Rather, the structures already present in different prob-
lem-domains impose constraints on what can be learnt, and what is learnt 
affects the very architectures that support future learning. 
This neural-constructivist model suggests a highly plastic mind, one re-
sponsive to the dynamic interaction between internal properties of the brain 
and experience-dependent neural activity. If it is true, it seems that we are 
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much more influenced by the changing features and structures of our envi-
ronment, even at the level of the cognitive architecture itself, than was once 
believed. Such gross plasticity may seem to invite, at least prima facie, pre-
cisely the kind of relativist view that Fodor hates so much. But this is a mis-
take. In fact, the neural constructivist picture lends itself nicely to a defense 
of realism. 
Thus recall the photographic analogy used (in Section 2) to distinguish 
between processing and product, and consider now the potential role of 
radical internal re-structuring in the veridical capture of whatever lies in 
front of the lens. Even if the most peripheral mechanisms of the camera (lens 
aperture, etc.) automatically adjust to the environmental conditions in which 
the scene we want to capture is taking place, it would surely be better still if 
the central mechanisms of our camera could also adjust to external condi-
tions by e.g. reconfiguring the central hardware according to need or use 
(sports photography, aerial photography, portraiture, etc.). 
Similarly, in many types of environment, biological organisms which are 
able to engage in input-driven processes of deep self re-design will have 
increased chances of survival and reproduction. In such processes of con-
structive learning, the internal mechanisms underlying different kinds of 
learning themselves get modified in ways likely to lead, in the kind of envi-
ronment actually encountered, to more accurate perceptions of the salient 
features of that environment. (It is true that different training environments 
might thus promote the development of quite different central conceptual 
resources. But by allowing neurological plasticity to play an important role 
in the constitution of our central cognitive capabilities, what we thus invite 
(and encourage) is not a relativist so much as a more pluralist epistemology 
and metaphysics). 
The anti-relativist grail, after all, is just to show how the actual environ-
ment surrounding the cognitive subject can become conceptualized in some 
objective way — and what this requires, empirically, is a realism-friendly 
account of the subject’s conceptual development and conceptual deploy-
ment. We need such an account because we want the story about our psy-
chological nature to comport with the plausible conviction that much of our 
knowledge accurately reflects our interactions with an independent world. 
We want our psychological profile to explain how it is possible for the world 
to become knowable and for our thoughts to become genuinely world-
engaged.  
Neural constructivism hypothesizes a psychological profile that lends 
considerable support to this realist project. For it suggests that human brains 
evolved precisely as engines of environmentally-driven plasticity. Such plas-
ticity allows for the early, experience-driven, development of relatively en-
capsulated perceptual modules, but adds into the equation the subsequent, 
still experience-driven (but now filtered via those modules) development of 
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more central cortical structures. The final image is thus of a whole process-
ing system — from sensory modules through central processing — whose 
biases and strategies reflect actual interactions with the surrounding envi-
ronment. This image, I contend, retains all the anti-relativist appeal of Fo-
dor’s fixed-module account, and affords the harmonization with central 
processing necessary (see Section 2) to secure objectivity at the level of con-
ceptual thought and judgment. Indeed, the neural constructivist account 
may be preferred even as regards the perceptual modules alone, since it ties 
such modules not to some distant ancestral environment, but directly to the 
kinds of patterned input encountered in the actual (early) environment. 
Recall, finally, the various forms of relativism identified in Section 1, viz., 
metaphysical, epistemological, and semantic. How might neural-
constructivism impact these three different varieties? Let’s start with meta-
physical relativism. In principle, it might be argued that a neuro-
constructivist perspective on cognition supports, rather than neutralizes, the 
idea that what exists, exists only relative to the framework of a particular 
thinker, community, or theory. However, the deep cognitive plasticity pos-
ited by the neural-constructivist can actually warrant a more realist view of 
how the world is, precisely by allowing the environmental and social interac-
tions of biological organisms with their actual environments to dynamically 
re-design their cognitive architecture. The key concept here is one of dynami-
cal re-structuring. Our cognitive architectures, rather than imposing a par-
ticular — and subject, community, or theory-variant — structure upon an 
unstructured world are open to a constant and sensitive re-negotiation so as 
to better reflect both our actual needs and projects and the (real) structures 
and opportunities provided by our actual environment. Such dynamic feed-
back promotes, rather than rules out, a more accurate partitioning of the 
world. 
What about epistemological and semantic relativism? As we saw, the 
neural-constructivist model of cognition stresses the influence of the biologi-
cal organism’s environment even at the level of its own cognitive architec-
ture. Doesn’t this lead to a rather strong epistemological and semantic rela-
tivism? Think, for instance, about the strongest possible case of plasticity of 
cognitive mechanisms, namely, plasticity induced by the interactions be-
tween the biological organism and its fellow organisms and their culture. It 
may seem rather likely that the resulting mechanisms are relative to the 
community in which the organism grows up and that this, in turn, threatens 
the idea that the mechanisms developed truly represent the environment in 
an objective way5. 
To address this issue, let me briefly introduce some very interesting em-
pirical results about categorization in olfaction and audition (Dubois, 2000). 
                                                                 
5 Thanks to one of the referees of this paper for pointing out this special risk to me. 
  Toribio: Modularity, Relativism, and Neural Constructivism 13 
The research was performed using a set of different psychological experi-
ments. In the case of olfactory stimuli, the experiments consisted in present-
ing the subjects (two groups of 40 people) with a sample of 16 familiar 
odors. Subjects were then asked to sort these odors and invited to comment 
on each category. Categories were constructed according to an empirical 
measure of similarity based on the number of subjects that located any given 
pair of odors within the same class (Dubois, 2000, p.39). The experiments on 
acoustic stimuli followed roughly the same pattern. This time 15 subjects 
were asked to sort out a set of 25 domestic noises (such as an alarm going 
off, a door closing, a nail clipper in action, etc.) in order to apply the same 
kind of algorithm for categorization as in the case of odors. 
The experiments, in both cases, were also designed to shed light on the 
relationships between the cognitive representation of these odors and noises 
and their linguistic verbalization. I shall not comment here on the linguistic 
side of this research. What interests me about this study is the cognitive 
status of subjects’ representations of the olfactory and acoustic stimuli. Re-
garding this particular aspect, the study shows, among other things, that — 
unlike visual inputs — odors and noises (as opposed to sounds6) are usually 
processed and represented as the effect of a particular source or a particular 
event on the perceiver, and thus do not have the same kind of objective 
status as visual objects do: 
“The experiments on odors and noises lead to the idea that .... the 
general process of categorization operates on the relations between 
the subject and the world, through the diversity of interactions sub-
jects can have with the world. It is therefore the subjects’ activities that 
structure their relations to the world, and hence their knowledge of 
the world, from which it follows that types of categories differ accord-
ing to the different types of relations the subjects have to the world. 
Hence, the simple opposition of an ‘object’ in the world being faced by 
a ‘subject’ considered as an ‘information processing system’ becomes 
problematic on both sides.” (Dubois, 2000, p. 59). 
The quote is long, but it nicely illustrates why constructive plasticity at the 
cortical level need pose no threat to the idea that the resulting re-structured 
cortical topology represents the environment in an objective way. Such a 
threat would be real only if the view of an organism’s mental representations 
being objective depended on their being determined quite independently of 
the organism’s general interactions with its environment. But this view, as 
                                                                 
6 The acoustic phenomena are characterized as ‘sounds’ when there is no source or identifi-
able event that can be linked to them. Unlike noises, sounds are processed on the basis of physi-
cal parameters, i.e., by parameters which belong more clearly to the objective world. Linguistic 
analyses of the lexicon used to refer to these two types of phenomena also reflect this difference 
(cf. Dubois, 2000, p. 54) 
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Dubois’ research helps illustrate, has little to recommend it. His analysis of 
odors and noises shows that the idea of a correct categorization of a particu-
lar stimulus encompasses not only olfactory or acoustic physical parameters 
which have been determined within the natural sciences, but also — and 
essentially — the organism’s own activities. 
Fodor’s fear of relativism, we recall, was the fear of wishful thinking  im-
pregnating our perceptual experiences, and the fear of wishful theorizing  pol-
luting our experimental results. But the thesis that there exists an intimate 
and dynamical relationship between mind and world is not, on its own, that 
kind of relativist thesis. Instead, it displays brains and environment as co-
operating to create a cognitive architecture better suited to negotiating the 
actual world, and thus opens the door to neither of Fodor’s twin demons. 
In sum, a neural-constructivist view of our cognitive capabilities provides 
a theoretical framework better able to take into account the dynamic interac-
tions between environment and cognitive architecture and thus better able 
to account for the objectivity of high-level thought and reason. The idea of 
neural plasticity playing an essential role in the construction of new cortical 
circuits also offers a new way of looking at evolutionary psychology7 and at 
the relationships between biological and cultural evolution. The cognitive 
landscape that the neural constructivist is beginning to sketch looks like a 
promising terrain where neuroscientists, biologists, psychologists, and phi-
losophers may find interesting tools, not only for addressing questions re-
garding relativism, but also for more general inquiries regarding the biologi-
cal basis of cognition. 
4. Conclusions: Shopping around 
Here is one way to view the present argument. Fodor (1985) offers the pres-
ence of evolutionarily tuned perceptual modules as a talisman against rela-
tivism. But the magic is weak, since the products of the perceptual process-
ing, and the way they are taken (categorized and used) by central processing 
are what really matters to conceptual thought and judgment. Fodor is un-
moved by this worry, perhaps because he also depicts central processing as 
deploying concepts and strategies which are largely fixed and innate (see 
Fodor, 1981). Such widespread fixity suggests, however, a rather stagnant 
cognizer, whose take on reality is surprisingly immune to the actual envi-
ronmental inputs they receive. This is hardly ideal, given the realist goal of 
keeping us in touch with the way things really are around us. A more con-
vivial empirical picture, for the realist, is offered — it was suggested — by 
                                                                 
7 Briefly, the neural constructivist sees the mind not as a fixed resource shaped by ancestral 
history but as (for the best part) a thoroughly plastic resource open to profound sculpting by 
early learning.  
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the emerging research program known as neural-constructivism. Human 
cognitive architecture, according to the neural constructivist, is persistently 
plastic at many levels, with early systemic inputs determining both details of 
perceptual modular organization and — a little later — of deep cortical spe-
cialization. This cascade of input-sensitive plasticity preserves the attractions 
of Fodor’s fixed-module story, allowing perceptual processing to be rela-
tively encapsulated and immune to top-level tinkering. But it simultane-
ously allows details of central processing and deep cognitive architecture to 
be affected by actual environmental inputs, and better ensures the required 
harmonization between perceptual representations and central thought and 
reason. The empirically sensitive realist is well advised, I conclude, to shop 
around. 
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